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I. INTRODUCTION
We are not surprised to find the government uses social networking
sites to investigate crimes'-or are we? An American couple was arrested for
eating an endangered species of iguana in the Bahamas in February 2009 after
I Jennifer Lynch, Government Finds Uses for Social Networking Sites Beyond Investigations,




Brown: An Illusory Expectation of Privacy: The ECPA Is Insufficient to P
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2011
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
posting pictures on Facebook.2 In September 2009, a woman was arrested for
violating a protective order with a Facebook "poke." During the same month,
police executed a warrant on the home of a self-proclaimed anarchist for coor-
dinating communications among protesters via Twitter at the Group of 20 sum-
mit in Pittsburgh.4 In July 2010, police arrested a nineteen-year-old mother after
she posted a photo of her infant son "smoking" from a bong.5 In February 2010,
a nineteen-year-old male got fifteen years in prison when he used Facebook to
blackmail more than thirty male classmates into having sex with him. 6 These
arrests raise a series of questions: Do individuals really understand their rights
to privacy when they post information on social networks? Further, what are
users' rights, and how does the government collect and utilize the information
found on social networks? 7
Although no one may be surprised by government agencies utilizing the
plethora of information individuals make publicly available on social networks,
individuals likely would be alarmed to learn that law enforcement agencies re-
cover "'private' content only shared among those chosen by the page owner."'
Hundreds of millions of users are logging on to social networks9 and providing
personal information under the guise that such information is only viewable by
the people to whom they give access.
Privacy law has evolved as new forms of communications presented
risks of intrusion. Beginning with no privacy in telephone communications,
2 Catharine Smith & Bianca Bosker, Arrested Over Facebook: 19 Posts That Got Suspects
Snagged, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/16/arrested-over-facebook-
po n 683160.html#sl27052&title=undefinedcouple arrestedafter; see also Adam Monacelli,
Barbecuing and Eating Endangered Iguanas Will Get You Arrested, COURIER POST ONLINE (Feb.
17, 2009), http://blogs.courierpostonline.com/fishhead/2009/02/17/barbecuing-and-eating-
endangered-iguanas-will-get-you-arrested/.
Eric Miller, Charges Against Alleged Facebook 'Poker' to be Considered by Grand Jury,




4 Paula Reed Ward, Men Arrested for G-20 Twittering Says it's Free Speech, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 5, 2009), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09278/1003126-
53.stm.
5 Mom Arrested After Posting Baby with Bong on Facebook, Fox 8 NEWS (Aug. 17, 2010,
3:01 AM), http://www.fox8.com/news/ktla-bong-baby-mother,0,6230425.story.
6 Dinesh Ramde, Anthony Stanc, 19, Gets 15 Years for Facebook Sex Scam, HUFFINGTON
POST (Feb. 24, 2010, 7:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/25/anthony-stanel-19-
gets-I5_n_476214.html.
7 Lynch, supra note 1.
8 DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN., Communications of People that Share Interests, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE (May 14, 2010), available at
http://www.eff.org/files/20100514_deasocialnetworking.pdf.
9 Facebook.com reports 750 million active users. See infra Part III.A.
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privacy law shifted to a reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz v. United
States,10 then to no expectation where a communication is disclosed to a third
party," and finally to a balance of privacy needs with the needs of law enforce-
ment involving electronic communications divulged to a service provider during
the course of transmission under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
198612 ("ECPA"). This Note discusses the lack of protection available to com-
munications via social networks under the ECPA, using Facebook as the prime
example of social network communications based on its ranking as the most
popular social network site. 13
Currently, the ECPA lacks clarity as presently applied to advanced on-
line communication tools because Congress enacted the ECPA in 1986 at a time
when individuals used dial-up modems to connect to the Internet, downloaded
e-mail, and before services such as Gmail, Facebook, and Twitter developed.
Because advanced communication tools were beyond congressional foresight,
the careful balance of needs Congress sought under the ECPA no longer meets
the needs of individuals, law enforcement, or the judicial system.
This Note argues that Congress must take legislative action and update
the ECPA to allow for an expansion of privacy protection over advanced com-
munication technology tools such as user-controlled social network activity be-
cause users' expectations meet the standards required both by the Supreme
Court and Congress. The Act no longer meets the intended balance of needs
between individuals and law enforcement. The ECPA is unclear and inconsis-
tently applied by courts in an area of the law that requires uniformity. Commu-
nication tools have advanced beyond the ECPA capabilities rendering the Act's
distinctions futile and its protection insufficient. Additionally, this Note argues
that Congress has historically intervened when the common law struggled to
keep up with the advancement of communication tools and that technological
progress since 1986 requires nothing short of revising the ECPA to include such
tools under its umbrella of protection.
II. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF PRIVACY LAW
The United States Constitution does not provide an explicit guarantee of
a right to privacy. 14 The Supreme Court interprets many amendments, particu-
larly the Fourth Amendment, as providing protection for a number of specific
types of individual privacy against government intrusion.15
10 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
1 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
12 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
Andy Kazeniac, Social Networks: Facebook Takes over Top Spot, Twitter Climbs,
COMPETEPULSE (Feb. 9, 2009, 2:01 PM), http://blog.compete.com/2009/02/09/facebook-myspace-
twitter-social-network/.
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Most of the Supreme Court's privacy jurisprudence centers on the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,' 6 which protects all per-
sons from "unreasonable searches and seizures."' 7 Specifically, the Fourth
Amendment states that all persons shall "be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," unless, on the
basis of probable cause, a warrant is issued with "particularity describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."' 8
Notably, Justice Louis Brandeis explained the right to privacy within
the context of the Fourth Amendment in a famous dissenting opinion:
The protection guaranteed by the [a]mendments is much broad-
er in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recog-
nized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, plea-
sure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things.
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their though-
ts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the [g]overnment, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
[g]ovemment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.' 9
Because the Constitution does not explicitly reference privacy, the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of individual privacy often is confusing, and the
scope of protection is narrow.20 Privacy is defined in a number of ways such as
an expression of one's personhood; "the right of [an] individual to define his or
her essence as a human being"; "autonomy . . . of the individual to engage in his
or her own thoughts, actions, and decisions"; or a citizen's ability to regulate
information about herself.21
The Supreme Court typically addresses issues of privacy on a case-by-
case basis. 2 2 New technologies create new privacy problems, and the Court his-
16 Id. at 57.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CATE, supra note 14, at 57.
18 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CATE, supra note 14, at 57.
19 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; CATE, supra note 14, at 52.
21 CATE, supra note 14, at 19.
22 See id. at 52.
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torically has responded slowly to these problems. 23 The rapid spread of new
information technologies into every day facets of life shed new light on privacy
issues-more people are using unprotected communication tools at the risk of
intrusion.24 The issues arising from the development of online communications
has not gone unnoticed, and the increased use of popular online communication
tools "has spawned an astonishing array of industry and academic conferences,
working groups, public interest and lobbying efforts, public surveys, and news
stories."
In the context of new information technologies, "privacy refers to con-
trolling the dissemination and use of data, including information that is kno-
wingly disclosed, as well as data that are unintentionally revealed as a by-
product of the use of the information technologies themselves."26 The Supreme
Court generally finds violations of the constitutional right to privacy in the con-
text of police searches or seizures of records without a warrant or without meet-
ing an exception to the warrant requirement. 27 The Court typically reserves ap-
plication of Fourth Amendment privacy rights to investigations and prosecutions
of criminal activity; further, protection "does not extend to information con-
trolled by a third party."2 8 Put another way, if something must be seen by a third
party, "it cannot really be private." 29
A. The Katz Standard: A Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy
Privacy is not determined by location or the method of intrusion, but ra-
ther the individual's intent to preserve his privacy, even in an area accessible by
the public. 3 0 Because privacy is defined by a person's intent, an intrusion is not
characterized by a physical trespass, but rather by a person's expectation.
23 See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1105 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (2006)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (making
the interception of any wire communications illegal and establishing federal regulations of tele-
graph, telephone, and radio communications); Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not forbid a non-physical intrusion); Transmission, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/585993/telephone/279924/Transmission (last up-
dated Aug. 10, 2010) (noting that Alexander Graham Bell first completed a transmission over the
telephone in 1876).
24 CATE, supra note 14, at 1.
25 Id.at1.
26 Id at 13.
27 Id. at 98-99.
28 Id. at 99.
29 HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 15 (rev. ed. 2006).
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The Supreme Court reached its decision to determine privacy on the ba-
sis of a person's expectation in Katz v. United States.3 2 In a majority decision,
the Supreme Court held that a warrantless wire tap in a telephone booth was
unconstitutional.3 3 The Supreme Court reasoned that a person using a public
telephone has a reasonable expectation of privacy: "One who occupies [a phone
booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a
call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will
not be broadcast to the world." 3 4
In overturning the lower court's decision, the Court recognized the im-
portance of the telephone, stating that "[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly
is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private
communication."35 Courts utilize Justice John M. Harlan's two-pronged test as
laid out in his concurrence to analyze privacy issues: 1) whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 2) whether society is willing to
recognize the expectation as reasonable. 36 The two-pronged test essentially bal-
ances the importance of an individual's right to privacy with the needs of law
enforcement-is society willing to recognize the expectation as reasonable
enough to forego law enforcement's need to investigate?
The Supreme Court's decision in Katz" overturned, in part, its previous
decision in Olmstead v. United States, which held that the Fourth Amendment
does not forbid a non-physical intrusion.38 Katz essentially clarified the congres-
sional intent behind the Communications Act of 1934," which made it illegal
for anyone to intercept any wire communications; established federal regula-
tions of telegraph, telephone, and radio communications; and created the Feder-
al Communications Commission to implement the regulations.40
B. Privacy, Party of Two: Third Party Disclosures Eviscerate Privacy Ex-
pectations
One caveat to the reasonable expectation of privacy is the Third Party
Doctrine4 1 laid out in United States v. Miller.42 The Third Party Doctrine limits
32 Id
33 Id. at 353.
34 Id. at 352.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
3 Id. at 351.
38 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
3 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (2006).
4 Id.
41 The rule established in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), is commonly refe-
renced by scholars as the "Third Party Doctrine." See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the
Third-party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REv. 561 (2009); Stephen E. Henders, The Timely Demise of
the Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REv. BULL. 39 (2011).
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the scope of Fourth Amendment privacy to communications between two
people. 4 3 In a 7-2 decision, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., writing for the Court,
stated that an individual "takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.""
In Miller, a case for tax fraud, the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court for a violation of constitutional privacy rights on the basis of a defective
subpoena duces tecum to seize bank records. 45 The Court stated that the Fourth
Amendment provides no privacy protection for information revealed to a third
party "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not
be betrayed." 4 6 To determine whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation
of privacy, the Court examined the nature of the communication and held that
the documents were not confidential communications.47 Instead, the Court stated
that the documents contained "information voluntarily conveyed" to be used in a
commercial transaction and exposed during the ordinary course of business. 48
C. A Digital Caveat to the Third Party Doctrine: Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act
The ECPA essentially carves out an exception to the Third Party Doc-
trine for electronic communications by striking a balance between an individu-
al's right to privacy and the needs of law enforcement to investigate. 49 Although
the ECPA prohibits the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tions,50 the Act provides for authorization of interception and disclosure of such
communications, and provides procedures for interception. 5 When Congress
enacted the Act in 1986, electronic communication tools had yet to become
popular, 5 2 but Congress recognized the significance of tools such as e-mail,
42 Miller, 425 U.S. 435.
43 Id. at 443.
4 Id.
45 Id at 436.
46 Id. at 443.
47 Id. at 442.
48 Id
49 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006); S. REP.
No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
so 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
51 Id.
52 Betsy Joyce, The Importance of Electronic Communication: Where We've Been, Where We
Are Now, and What's Coming, PUBLIC ROADS, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 43, available at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/02janfeb/iwatch.cfm. Electronic mail and the
Internet were still in early stages of development at the time Congress enacted the ECPA. Id. As
the Internet grew in the 1990s, e-mail communication also became more popular. Id
2011] 283
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which signifies preparation for future privacy issues before individual privacy
faced technological challenges. 53
The problematic section of the ECPA affecting online privacy is the
Stored Communications Act5 4 ("SCA"), which creates an exception to the Third
Party Doctrine established in Miller for third party network service provider
users. The SCA governs issues of online privacy and was enacted as part of the
ECPA5 in 1986. The SCA protects the privacy rights of users and subscribers
of two types of third party network service providers-electronic communica-
tion services ("ECS") and remote computing services ("RCS"). 5 6
III. BACKGROUND: SOCIAL NETWORKING DEFINED
Just as the courts have worked toward defining the scope of individual
privacy, defining social networks is imperative to carving out a place for social
media in privacy law. Definitions of social networks vary, but how a social net-
work and the use of social networks are defined result in important legal impli-
cations. In Doe v. Myspace,57 the Fifth Circuit defined social networking as "the
practice of using a Web site or other interactive computer service to expand
one's business or social network."58 The court further defined social networking
as an "online profile" created by and for each individual member "that serves as
a medium for personal expression, and can contain such items as photographs,
videos, and other information about the member that he or she chooses to share
.... Members have complete discretion regarding the amount and type of in-
formation that is included in a personal profile." 9
Facebook, which touts itself to be "one of the most-trafficked sites in
the world," 6 0 describes social networking as "a social utility that helps people
communicate more efficiently with their friends, family and coworkers," 6 with
a special focus on "giving people control over their experience so they can ex-
press themselves freely while knowing that their information is being shared in
the way they intend." 62 The Doe court vaguely suggested controlled communi-
5 Id.
54 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2711 (2006).
5 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
56 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
5 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
58 Id. at 415.
s9 Id.
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cation as a characteristic of social networking by discussing it in terms of discre-
tionary disclosure.63
Furthermore, hundreds of millions of users depend on social networks,
such as Facebook, to communicate with friends, family, and other acquaintances
with similar interests. As the law stands, however, the ECPA does not provide
any legitimate privacy protection from unreasonable searches or seizures for
social network users.
A. How Social Networks Work
Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Executive Officer of Facebook, launched Fa-
cebook in 2004.64 Upon its inception, Facebook primarily offered services to
college students.6' Facebook made its free services accessible to anyone with a
registered e-mail address in 2006, and its popularity quickly exploded.6 6 Face-
book alone lauds more than 750 million active users, fifty percent of whom log
on to the network daily via computer or cellular phone. 67 In just five years, Fa-
cebook left Zuckerberg's Harvard dorm room and entered the homes and pock-
ets of hundreds of millions of users.68
Creating a Facebook account is simple. Prospective users visit the web-
site and become a member in a matter of seconds by simply entering basic in-
formation-name, e-mail address, gender, and birthday-then creating a pass-
word. 69 After becoming a member, the initially entered information becomes the
user's profile.70 Users then can supplement the initial profile information by
adding interests, education, and photos.71
Once a user creates his or her profile, she can add "friends" through a
simple name or e-mail address search thereby extending her network by finding
friends, family, and people with similar interests.72 Users send a friend request
and the recipient either accepts or rejects the request giving users control over
63 528 F.3d at 415.
6 Executive Bios, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press#!/press/info.php?execbios (last
visited Sept. 11, 2011).
65 Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press#!/press/info.php?timeline (last visited
Sept. 11, 2011).
66 Id.
67 Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press#!/press/info.php?statistics (last vi-
sited Sept. 11, 2011).
68 Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press#!/press/info.php?timeline (last visited
Sept. 11, 2011).
69 Sign Up for Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/r.php (last visited July 9,
2011).
70 Richard M. Guo, Stranger Danger and the Online Social Network, 23 BERKLEY TECH. L.J.
617, 620 (2008).
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who views their profiles.7 3 By adding "friends," users essentially link their pro-
files to each other creating an online community, 74 and "[t]his linking creates a
'friendship' between any two users, and generally allows each user to access the
other's profile."7 5 Essentially, the more a user's profile grows the more her on-
line community grows, 6 and, furthermore, "the more information the user sup-
plies, the greater her ability to connect with others."
Users who have access to other profiles generally have the ability to
post comments on a friend's "wall" or on other items friends post like photos,
video, or links to other websites. In November 2010, Facebook introduced
Facebook Message, which is a "unified messaging system" that allows users to
send messages via the Web or mobile phone regardless of whether they are us-
ing online chat, text messages, or e-mail.79 Facebook Message has been called a
"bold move" by reviewers because Facebook is "expand[ing] from a social net-
work into a full-fledged communications system. It could help the company
chip away even more at Internet portals like Google, Yahoo, MSN and AOL,
which have used e-mail as one of their main draws with consumers."so
Further, Facebook opened its services to third parties in May 2007
through Facebook Platforms. Facebook Platforms invite third party software
makers to create programs for the service and to make money on advertising
alongside them. 82 The initiative stimulated the creation of hundreds of applica-
tions such as games, music, and photo sharing tools. 8 3 Facebook describes the
process as necessary to help users "share expressive and relevant content."84
Facebook pre-approves third party websites and applications using the Plat-
form,85 then provides the third parties with a user's general information at the
time the user accesses them. 86
73 Nathan Petrashek, The Fourth Amendment and the Brave New World of Online Social Net-
working, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 1495, 1499-1500 (Summer 2010).
74 Guo, supra note 70, at 620.
75 Id.
76 Petrashek, supra note 73, at 1500.
77 Id
78 Using Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?tab=browse (last visited Oct.
2, 2011).
79 Miguel Helft, Facebook Offers New Messaging Tool, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2010, available
at http://tech.mit.edu/V130/N54/long2.html.
80 Id.
81 Facebook Unveils Platform for Developers of Social Applications, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/press/releases.php?p=3102 (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
82 Kevin Allison, Facebook Spreads its Web Wider, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 29, 2007, at 24.
83 Id.
84 Facebook Platform Policies, FACEBOOK, http://developers.facebook.com/policy/#principles
(last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
85 Id.
86 Id. at§ 11.
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In doing so, Facebook made user information available to another par-
ty--communications are now shared among user's friends, Facebook, and Face-
book Platforms. However, most users are likely unaware of the implications
most of these new applications have on their privacy and "are, at best, con-
fused about the security of their data ...
B. The Privacy Policy:9 User Control and Network Access
Individuals, particularly young people, are beginning to lead their social
lives online under the guise that their online conversations and communications
are far more private than they are.90 Social networks, like Facebook, allow users
to actively control the information they share through privacy controls-
"public," "friends," "only me," or "custom."91 Privacy settings can be custo-
mized for contact information, user posts, gender, birthday, and other personal
information.92
However, Facebook reserves the right to make a user's name, profile
picture, and networks publicly available. 93 Such information remains under the
"public" setting, which is accessible by anyone on the Internet, even those not
logged onto Facebook.9 4 Furthermore, information set to "public" also is ac-
cessible by "the games, applications, and websites" users and user's friends util-
ize.95 Users can prevent application access by turning off all Facebook "Apps,"
but then "will no longer be able to use any games or other applications." 96 Fa-
cebook also notifies users in its policy that such information may be associated
87 Comments of Digital Due Process, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS 6 (June 14, 2010),
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/files/NTIANOI_061410.pdf (comments submitted in response
to a Notice of Inquiry sent out by the United States Department of Commerce National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration).
88 Id.
89 Facebook refers to its privacy policy as a "Data Use Policy." Facebook's Data Use Policy,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/#!/full-data use policy (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). Al-
though the author is using Facebook as a primary example of social networks, the use of "Privacy
Policy" is a term used to generally refer to policies expressly regarding a user's control over in-
formation she posts to a social network.
90 JOHN PALFREY & URs GASSER, BoRN DIGITAL 53-54 (2008).
91 Id. at 56; see also Data Use Policy: Control Over Your Profile, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/#controlprofile (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
92 Data Use Policy: Control Each Time You Post, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/#controlprofile (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
9 Data Use Policy: Information We Receive and How It Is Used, FACEBOOK,
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with the user, including name and profile picture, outside of Facebook on public
search engines and other sites users visit.97
Lastly, a user has the option to "deactivate" or "delete" her account.98
Deactivating an account puts an "account on hold" by making the user's profile
inaccessible by others, but the information is not deleted. 99 Deleting an account
permanently removes all information from the network, but deleting takes a
minimum of one month and up to ninety days. oo Although Facebook's Privacy
Policy makes certain information public by default, its controls are still better
than most other social networks in this regard.01
Facebook's Privacy Policy also reserves the right to access information
for a laundry list of uses such as service management, contacting the user, to
supplement user profiles, friend searches, to make suggestions, and most impor-
tantly, targeted advertising. 102 Targeted advertising is referred to as a way "to
measure or understand the effectiveness of ads."1 Facebook does not share
user information with advertisers; rather, advertisers choose user characteristics
and Facebook accesses user information, including sensitive information set to
private, to properly target advertising to users with the chosen characteristics.1 0 4
Facebook explains that it uses the information "to provide Facebook as it exists
today" and to allow the network to provide users with "innovative features and
services" in the future. 05
IV. APPLICATION OF THE ECPA LACKS CLARITY IN OUR FAST-PACED
DIGITAL AGE
Because Congress enacted the ECPA long before the introduction of
current electronic communication tools, the narrowly tailored distinctions for
which the Act provides protection force courts to struggle to meet Congress's
intended purpose in the balance of needs between individual privacy and law
enforcement. The narrow distinctions laid out in the ECPA have resulted in dif-
ficulty because most current communication tools do not fit under the defined
electronic communications covered by the ECPA.
9 Id.
98 Data Use Policy: Deleting and Deactivating Your Account, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#deleting (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
99 Id.
10 Id.
1ot PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 90, at 56.
102 Data Use Policy: How We Use the Information We Receive, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#howweuse (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
1o3 Id.
' Data Use Policy: How Advertising Works, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-infofpersonalizedads (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
105 Data Use Policy: How We Use the Information We Receive, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/your-info#howweuse (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
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Courts struggle to define new communication tools and find it difficult
to apply the ECPA-such difficulties have resulted in circuit splits in the ECPA
application. These misapplications and circuit splits are a direct result of a nar-
rowly defined act lacking foresight to predict communication advancements. In
order to ensure uniformity in application and to supply courts with a clear work-
able act, Congress must intervene and amend the ECPA to establish clear dis-
tinctions and definitions applicable to advanced communication tools.
A. Legally Defining Social Networks
When individuals utilize privacy settings and limit access to their in-
formation on social networking sites, their communications should be deemed
private under the ECPA. Defining a social network is of key significance in
determining whether a user has an expectation of privacy in her communications
or whether the communication falls under the protection of the ECPA. The Doe
court's attempt was a good start at defining social networking,106 but the opinion
misses a key element of the online activity: social networking is a controlled
communication knowingly shared in a specific manner to a specific person or a
specific group of people.
The Doe court vaguely suggested controlled communication as a cha-
racteristic of social networking by discussing it in terms of discretionary disclo-
sure; 10 7 however, the court missed an important component described by Face-
book as a communication knowingly shared the way the user intends.0 8 The
user's intent is important because if the user takes advantage of the privacy tools
available on social networks, the user essentially has an expectation of privacy
by utilizing the available privacy controls to limit access to his or her informa-
tion.
User control of privacy settings gives the illusion of privacy and should
be protected under Katz. The Court in Katz overturned Olmstead and accepted
the congressional intent behind the Communications Act of 1934, which moved
away from the old view of privacy as a physical intrusion.' 09 The new test for
Fourth Amendment privacy was established, and now individuals can expect
protection if they have a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the com-
munication is made." 0
Users are led to believe that the details of their Facebook activity are
private and likely have no intent to publish the information because "[m]ost
users of Facebook treat it as a sort of online scrapbook for their lives-posting
106 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008).
107 Id. at 415.
1os Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (last visited Sept.
14, 2011).
'0 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § § 151-609 (1934).
110 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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everything from basic information about themselves to photos to calendars of
events they plan to attend.""' However, by instinctively clicking "accept" to the
network's Privacy Policy, a user unknowingly clicks away her rights because
she "accepts" that the information she shares is being accessed and used for
public purposes while eviscerating any reasonable expectation of privacy.
By accepting the Privacy Policy, users agree to allow Facebook to
access and use information, and often to allow Facebook Platform access by
using applications and playing games.112 This third party access renders social
network communications unprotected under the Third Party Doctrine estab-
lished in Miller because communications revealed to a third party are not private
"even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed."" 3
Users, however, likely do not realize Facebook reserves such access
rights to use their shared information regardless of privacy settings.1 4 Evidence
suggests that few users read privacy policies let alone change default settings." 5
Furthermore, "even for those who are aware of the choices, keeping track of
privacy settings can be difficult . . . .' Control settings effectively lead users
to believe that their information is only viewable by the people they give access
via personal privacy settings.
As it stands, the ECPA does not provide any protection for social net-
working communications contrary to congressional intent. Digital Due Process,
a privacy advocates coalition, reasons that the ECPA meets none of the goals set
forth by Congress prior to its enactment because "[a]s presently applied, the
ECPA does not comport with user expectations, does not meet law enforcement
or judicial needs for clarity, creates non-trivial costs for businesses seeking to
comply with law enforcement requirements, and erects barriers to the adoption
of innovating, productivity enhancing technology by American business."" 7
Specifically, individuals using social networks to communicate as an al-
ternative to other traditional communications can expect little if any protection
from the ECPA. "' The ECPA provides only "weak protection" for information
stored on social networks "[e]ven when private records, photos and other mate-
' Vauhini Vara, Facebook Gets Personal with Ad Targeting Plan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23,
2007, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 118783296519606151 .html.
112 See supra Part I1.B (discussing the access users grant Facebook by accepting the network's
privacy policy).
" 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
" PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 90, at 57.
" Id.
116 Id.
" J. Beckwith Burr, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: Principles for
Reform, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS 3 (Mar. 30, 2010),
http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/files/DDPBurrMemo.pdf.
118 Id. at 16.
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rials are shared only with a couple of friends... , allowing governmental access
without a warrant." 1 9
Congress intended the ECPA to be an exception for electronic commu-
nications, such as social networking activity, because although such communi-
cations are unprotected under the Third Party Doctrine, users do not intend to
disclose information to another party. Although a user "accepts" a social net-
work's Privacy Policy, she still intends for her communications to remain pri-
vate when she limits access to her information because the service's privacy
controls create an illusion of privacy. Whether the Privacy Policy maintains a
user's privacy is irrelevant because the user herself intends the communication
to be private, and the user has a reasonable expectation of privacy when she
limits access through service-provided privacy controls.
Under Miller, disclosing a communication to a third party, even if for a
limited purpose, deems that communication unprotected. However, the ECPA
protects certain types of electronic communications disclosed to third parties for
the limited purpose of transmission and maintenance. 120 As defined under the
ECPA, transmission and maintenance do not include targeted advertising or
Facebook Platforms utilized by social networks and other advanced communica-
tions like commercial e-mail. 21 Because these services depend on these practic-
es to remain competitive and available to users, and because users do not intend
to publish their communications, such disclosures should be folded into the cur-
rent definition of transmission and maintenance to ensure the balance of needs
among users, service providers, and law enforcement intended by Congress.
B. Where Warshak Went Wrong-Why Case-by-Case Analysis Is Insuffi-
cient
Third party access required by social networks diminishes Fourth
Amendment protection under the Third Party Doctrine rendering a reasonable
expectation of privacy immaterial once the information is disclosed. Because
online communications such as social network activity fit the prerequisite re-
quirements Congress intended the ECPA to protect, amending the ECPA is a
more strategic and reasonable avenue to update the law to comply with ad-
vancements in online communications.
In United States v. Warshak,12 2 however, the Sixth Circuit held that a
user enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy independent of the ECPA in the
contents of e-mails "that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commer-
cial ISP." 1 23 Further, the Court found portions of the SCA unconstitutional:
" Id.
120 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006).
121 Id.
122 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
123 Id. at 288 (citing Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 473 (6th Cir. 2007)).
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"Moreover, to the extent that the SCA purports to permit the government to
obtain such emails warrantlessly, the SCA is unconstitutional." 24 In holding the
SCA unconstitutional, the court referred to the distinctions between an ECS and
an RCS, and the 180 day time limit for electronic storage.125 The court found
support for finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in United States v.
Forrester that suggested contents of an online communication may deserve
Fourth Amendment protection.126
Warshak used the two-pronged Katz testl2 7 in finding that e-mail users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, stating first that the defendant "plainly
manifested an expectation that his emails would be shielded from outside scruti-
ny."l28 Further, the court noted that given the "sensitive and damning"l29 con-
tents of the e-mails, the idea that the defendant intended the communication to
be public was highly unlikely because "people seldom unfurl their dirty laundry
in plain view."o Analogizing to postal mail and the telephone, the court deter-
mined whether society was willing to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in e-mail, and explained that the "explosion of Internet-based communi-
cations" has replaced traditional methods of communication.' 3' The court fur-
ther stated that because of "the fundamental similarities between e[-]mail and
traditional forms of communication, it would defy common sense to afford e[-
]mails lesser Fourth Amendment protection." 32
The court distinguished Miller on the basis that the possibility or risk of
third party access does not extinguish an expectation of privacy, and that the
communications at issue were inherently different.'13 The court stated that the e-
mail communications at issue were inherently different compared to the banking
records in Miller because e-mail contains highly confidential communications
whereas banking records merely constitute business records used in the ordinary
course of business. 134 Additionally, the court looked to Katz to determine that
the "right" of access also does not affect the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy because at the time Katz was decided, telephone companies typically
reserved a right to monitor calls for safety purposes.135 Further, the court stated
that in Miller the bank used information in the ordinary course of business, whe-
124 Id
125 Id at 282-83, 288.
126 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008).
127 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 516 (J. Harlan, concurring).
128 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 284.
129 Id. at 284.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 286.
132 Id. at 285.
13 Id. at 287.
134 Id
135 Id. at 286.
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reas an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") acts as an intermediary in the trans-
mission of communications, and the content of the communications is not in-
tended for the ISP. 136
The court's ruling in Warshak created a broad designation of privacy in
e-mail, but neglected to take into account that Web-based e-mail services, like
social networks, utilize targeted advertising, which authorizes an ISP access to
the contents of communications for use in marketing campaigns. 13 7 The com-
munications at issue in Warshak were stored on an ISP that had not expressed
an intent to "'audit, inspect, and monitor' its subscriber's emails."'13 The court
suggested that communications on ISPs with such express intent may not be
private, but was unwilling to hold that a subscriber agreement would never be
broad enough to diminish a reasonable expectation of privacy. 139
Although the court took a much needed leap toward online privacy, a
problem arises because it was just that-a leap. The court unnecessarily circum-
vented thirty years of precedent holding that an individual does not have a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in communications voluntarily turned over to a
third party. 140 The court's broad stroke of constitutional interpretation likely will
face strict scrutiny under the lens of established case law. The court should have
taken a statutory approach by analyzing the communications under the SCA's
distinctions to find that the SCA lacks clarity and is outdated in light of the ad-
vanced capabilities of communication tools, social acceptance, and importantly,
the legislative intent behind the ECPA.
C. Distinctions in the ECPA Are Futile in Our Digital World-Circuits
Split on Application of the ECPA to Advanced Communication Tools
As a forward-looking act, the ECPA no longer meets the needs of tech-
nologically savvy individuals because the language of the Act is specifically
tailored to old technology. In order to understand the privacy issues facing so-
cial network users, understanding the complex concepts of the ECPA is impera-
tive. Congress enacted the ECPA at a time when electronic communication was
136 Id. at 288.
13 See supra Part III.B (discussing the use of information for targeted advertising).
138 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 287.
139 id
140 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that a pen register, a device used to
record electronic information, such as a dialed telephone number, was not an unreasonable search
because the dialed number is always available to the phone company, and thus, the user voluntari-
ly turned the information over to third parties, assuming the risk of disclosure); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (holding the Fourth Amendment provides no privacy protection for
information revealed to a third party "even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it
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in its early stages, and when comparatively fewer people utilized the technology
than at present.14' The ECPA since has become outdated:
ECPA, which served us remarkably well for many years, is to-
day unwieldy and unreliable as a law enforcement tool, im-
mensely difficult for judges and investigators to apply, confus-
ing, costly, and full of legal uncertainty for communications and
other technology tools and service providers, and an unpredict-
able guardian of our country's long cherished privacy values.142
To put the concept of technological advancements into perspective, in
1984 Apple released the 128k Macintosh, which retailed at $2,495, with a nine-
inch screen and a mouse.143 Today, Apple's MacBook Notebook retails at $999
boasting an LED backlit widescreen display, a multi-touch track pad, a built-in
camera, a built-in ten-hour battery, 2GB of memory, and a 500GB hard drive.144
Furthermore, the Apple iPhone4 retails at $199145 lauding 16GB capacity, 3.5-
inch widescreen multi-touch display, video recording, a five megapixel still
camera, and cellular and wireless access that all fit in your pocket.146
Twenty-five years after its inception, the ECPA no longer meets the
needs of individuals who utilize these tools because the Act applies only to two
distinct classifications of electronic communications that no longer apply to
most communication tools used today. Specifically, the Act protects communi-
cations in an ECS, which allows for temporary storage in the course of trans-
mission, and communications in an RCS, which are considered in permanent
storage. 147
At the time Congress enacted the Act, subscribers used electronic com-
munication services to send and receive electronic communications, typically e-
mail, and to outsource computing tasks for storage capacity on remote compu-
ting services.14 8 During communication transmission in the 1980s, computers
141 See infra Part V.B.
142 Burr, supra note 117, at 3.
143 Jeremy Reimer, Total Share: 30 Years of Personal Computer Market Share Figures, ARS
TECHNICA, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2005/12/total-share.ars/4 (last visited Sept. 16,
2011).
144 The MacBook, APPLE, http://www.apple.comL/macbook/features.html (last visited Sept. 16,
2011).
145 Apple Store, APPLE, http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shop iphone/family/iphone (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
146 IPhone 4 Technical Specifications, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/specs.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2011).
147 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(12), (15), 2711 (2006).
148 See Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
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made copies of the message, and placed them in "electronic storage" pending
delivery, which would often remain in the provider's storage space for several
months. 149 Additionally, remote computing services received data from users for
storage and processing, and also often retained the data in electronic storage for
several months.150 Both services allow for minimal third party access to private
information while retaining privacy protection.151
The SCA defines "electronic communications" narrowly to tools avail-
able in the 1980s. According to the SCA, an "electronic communication" is "any
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence," and an
electronic communication service is "any service which provides to users the-
reof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." 5 2 The
Act is narrowly tailored to provide protection for the specifically defined com-
munication in that an ECS is prohibited from divulging or giving unauthorized
access to electronic communications of users while the information is in elec-
tronic storage (a third party disclosure)-temporary, intermediate storage, which
is incidental to transmitting the communication or storage for the purpose of
backup protection.'5 3 On the contrary, the SCA prohibits an RCS from divulging
communications carried or maintained for the purpose of transmission or sto-
rage. 154 The Act defines an RCS as "the provision to the public of computer
storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications sys-
tem.""ss An ECS is defined as a facility used for the "transmission of electronic
communications, and any computer facilities used for storage of such communi-
cations." 156
Notably, the SCA only provides Fourth Amendment privacy protection
requiring a warrant for communications held in electronic storage for less than
180 days. 5 7 In contrast, combined with prior notice, a government entity needs
only a subpoena or a court order based on "specific and articulable facts" to
compel disclosure of electronic communications that are in electronic storage
for more than 180 days.158 The distinction is imperative in the analysis because
privacy protection depends on whether a communication is found on an ECS in
temporary storage, or an RCS for permanent storage.'59 One scholar describes
the process: "when an e-mail sitting on a third-party server ages from 180 days
149 Id.
150 Id
151 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2006).
152 Id § 2510(12), (15).
15 Id. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2510(17).
154 Id. § 2702(a)(2).
1ss Id. § 2711(2).
156 Id. § 2510(14).
1 Id.
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to 181 days, a user no longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in its con-
tents."160 Electronic communications compelled disclosure rules also apply to
subscriber information such as name, address, and session times.161
Many courts addressing privacy issues in light of advanced communica-
tion tools get caught up in the futile distinctions in the ECPA between an RCS
and an ECS. Because the ECPA provides privacy protection only for temporari-
ly stored electronic communications, the distinction is important to analysis, but
futile in the context of advanced communications. 162 Communications on an
ECS are in temporary storage during transmission and may only be accessed
with a warrant, but once the communication is delivered to the recipient, and
opened, the communication is considered discarded after 180 days and is no
longer protected.163 On the contrary, electronic communications stored on an
RCS are essentially in permanent storage, and may be accessed by a trial sub-
poena.
Problems arise, however, because of the nuances of advanced commu-
nication tools that allow users to communicate in a variety of ways, quickly,
while providing unlimited storage capacity. Circuits are split in deciding how to
analyze these nuances under the current state of the ECPA.165
More than a decade ago, the Ninth Circuit recognized the ECPA as a
"complex, often convoluted, area of the law."1 66 Upon addressing similar issues
in 2002, the Ninth Circuit stated that difficulties are
compounded by the fact that ECPA was written prior to the ad-
vent of the Internet and the World Wide Web. As a result, the
existing statutory framework is ill-suited to address modem
forms of communication . . . . Courts have struggled to analyze
problems involving modem technology within the confines of
this statutory framework, often with unsatisfying results. 167
In United States v. Weaver,16 8 the Seventh Circuit held that a court
could compel an ISP to comply with a subpoena ordering disclosure of the con-
tents of a subscriber's opened e-mails that were less than 180 days old because
160 Achal Ozza, Amend ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails Get Dusty, 88
B.U. L. REv. 1043, 1057 (2008).
161 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
162 Kerr, supra note 148, at 1217.
163 Id. at 1216 (unopened communications are on an ECA and are protected for 180 days or
until the recipient opens the communication then the message is considered to be on an RCS).
16 18 U.S.C. § 2703.
165 See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004); but see United States v. Weaver,
636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770 (C.D. 111. 2009). See also Kerr, supra note 148, at 1216-17.
16 United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.1998).
167 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
168 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
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the e-mails were not in electronic storage. The court held that the ISP, Microsoft
Hotmail, was both an RCS and an ECS because once the defendant opened the
e-mails, he left the e-mails on the ISP in order to return to the messages at a
later date. 169
The court further reasoned that the ECPA requires communications on
an ECS be stored for backup purposes in order to be protected for 180 days after
opening, whereas communications opened and stored on an RCS are being
stored "solely for the purpose of storage or processing services" and are not
protected by the warrant provision. 170 Because the Microsoft Hotmail subscriber
opened the e-mails and saved the messages to return to them on "subsequent
occasions," Microsoft went from an ECS to an RCS, and was maintaining the
messages "solely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing
services to such subscriber or customer."17 ' As electronic communications
stored on an RCS, the court held the messages were accessible by subpoena.172
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones,17 1 the court held that once a subscriber opens
an e-mail, any version that is on the ISP is held for backup purposes on an ECS
and is protected for 180 days.
An obvious purpose for storing a message on an ISP's server af-
ter delivery is to provide a second copy of the message in the
event that the user needs to download it again-if, for example,
the message is accidentally erased from the user's own comput-
er. The ISP copy of the message functions as a "backup" for the
user. Notably, nothing in the Act requires that the backup pro-
tection be for the benefit of the ISP rather than the user. Storage
under these circumstances thus literally falls within the statutory
definition. 174
The court essentially qualified e-mail, as used today, as electronic
communications in temporary, intermediate storage, on an ECS. The court ex-
plained that "[w]here the underlying message has expired in the normal course,
any copy is no longer performing any backup function. An ISP that kept perma-
nent copies of temporary messages could not fairly be described as 'backing up'
those messages." 75
As distinguished from Weaver, the Theofel court held that once a mes-
sage in an ECS is delivered and opened, if the message remains, it is being held




1' 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
174 Id. at 1070.
's Id. at 1076.
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for backup purposes and the content is protected until it "expire[s] in the normal
course" and a warrant is required for access.' 7 6 Whereas Weaver held that the
ISP shifts from an ECS to an RCS once the message is opened because the ISP
is then maintaining the message solely for the purpose of storage, and is access-
ible by a subpoena.177
The split in application occurs because when Congress enacted the
ECPA in 1986 the communications it intended to protect were e-mails down-
loaded onto a personal computer (electronic communications delivered via an
ECS), and data stored on a server (an RCS).'78 Now ISPs can easily store vo-
lumes upon volumes of e-mails providing easy and efficient access such that
downloading an e-mail today would be not only inefficient, but also impractic-
al.179 Basically, it makes more sense to leave e-mail on the ISP because the mes-
sages are then accessible from anywhere via the Internet, and can be revised,
revisited, and re-sent at any time.
The question arises, however, when an e-mail is sent, received, and
opened. Once opened, if the user leaves the message on the ISP in order to store
it for future access, is the message stored for ECS backup purposes or is it
stored solely for the purpose of storage or computer processing services on an
RCS? Furthermore, where do social networks fit in this distinction? The ques-
tions and issues the ECPA application raise could be remedied easily by an
amendment that merely updates the definitions of the categorical distinctions for
electronic communications.
D. Crispin Carves Out a Place for Social Networks Under the ECPA
The Ninth Circuit is the only Circuit to address the applicability of the
ECPA to social networks,so and is a prime example of why the ECPA is un-
workable. In Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., the court held that "wall posts"
with limited access and private messages on social networking services consti-
tuted "electronic communication services" falling under the umbrella of protec-
tion found in the ECPA.' 8 ' Crispin serves as an illustrative example of a court
trying to fit a square peg in a round hole in order to implement the congressional
intent behind the ECPA.
The court compared "wall posts" to private electronic bulletin board
systems ("BBS"), which it previously held to be protected under the ECPA,
stating
176 Id.
177 United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
178 Ozza, supra note 160, at 1057.
179 Id
180 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
181 Id. at 989.
[Vol. 114298
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 114, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol114/iss1/10
AN ILLUSORYEXPECTA TION OF PRIVACY
[b]ecause Facebook wall postings and MySpace comments, on
the one hand, and bulletin postings on a website . . . cannot be
considered to be in temporary, intermediate storage, . . . the
postings, once made, are stored for backup purposes . . . As a
consequence, . . . Facebook and MySpace are ECS providers as
respects wall postings and comments and that such communica-
tions are in electronic storage.182
The court further reasoned that regardless of how many other users have
access to the information (i.e., an individual user's Facebook friends), the in-
formation remains in electronic storage. 183 The court stated that the number of
users with access is of "no legal significance" and to make a distinction "would
result in arbitrary line-drawing and likely in the anomalous result that businesses
such as law firms, which may have thousands of employees who can access
documents in storage, would be excluded from the statute."18 4
Additionally, the court looked to Theofel for support holding that the
Act does not require backup purposes be to the benefit of only the recipient user.
In this regard, the court analogizes to Theofel, where the Ninth
Circuit interpreted the "for purposes of backup protection" lan-
guage in § 2510(17)(B), and concluded that any backup purpose
was sufficient, whether for the benefit of the email user or for
the benefit of the ISP. Applying this logic to the RCS defini-
tion, it does not matter that the stored Facebook wall postings
and MySpace comments are available to hundreds or thousands
of approved users.1ss
Although Crispin relied on a decision within its circuit, Theofel has not
gone without its share of criticism. In Weaver, the Sixth Circuit stated that Theo-
fel distinguished ECS backup storage and RCS backup storage "on the assump-
tion that users download emails from an ISP's server to their own computers"
and that the "distinction between web-based e[-]mail and other e[-]mail systems
made Theofel largely inapplicable."186
Additionally, scholars find Theofel difficult to "square with the statutory
test." 1 7 The Theofel test for determining whether an e-mail is an electronic
communication stored for backup purposes on an ECS or an RCS depends on
182 id.
183 Id. at 990.
184 id.
185 Id. (internal citations omitted).
186 United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
187 Kerr, supra note 148, at 1217.
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whether the e-mail "has expired in the normal course." 188 And according to
some, the Act already has express provisions determining the "lifespan" of such
electronic communications:18 9
The difficulty is that § 2703(a) already defines such a lifespan
elsewhere in explicit statutory terms; the statute provides one
set of rules for contents in electronic storage held "for one hun-
dred and eighty days or less" and provides another set of rules
for contents in electronic storage held for longer than 180
days. 190
Further, the court in Crispin, just like the court in Warshak, failed to
address the issues that arise when social networks utilize targeted advertising
and Facebook Platforms, which allows the service provider to access the user's
information for purposes other than those necessary to providing service.' 9' In
relying on Theofel, the court neglected to consider outside third party access to
information utilized for purposes not addressed in Theofel. Crispin blindly relies
on the premise that the purpose of backup storage is irrelevant as set forth in
Theofel without analyzing the outside factors affecting a user's privacy beyond
what he or she limits through privacy controls.19 2
V. SOCIAL DEPENDENCY REQUIRES CONGRESSIONAL INTERVENTION
Congressional intervention is necessary to ensure privacy rights for in-
dividuals utilizing advanced communication tools. In 1986, the narrowly tai-
lored scope of the ECPA met the needs of the stated dual purpose set forth by
Congress-to protect the privacy of citizens and to address the needs of law
enforcement.193 Congress based its reasoning for intervening on a report con-
ducted by the Office of Technology Assessment that concluded "current legal
protections for electronic mail [were] . . . 'weak, ambiguous, or non-existent,'
and that 'electronic mail remains legally as well as technically vulnerable to
unauthorized surveillance."'l
94
When Congress enacted the ECPA, e-mail was in its early stages while
the number of e-mail users in 1986 was comparatively lower than the number of
188 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004).
189 Kerr, supra note 148, at 1217.
190 Id.
191 See supra Part III.B.
192 Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 990 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
'9 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3558.
194 Id. at 3558 (quoting Federal Government Information Technology: Electronic Surveillance
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users at present.' 95 To send an e-mail, a subscriber connected to the Internet via
dial-up modem, and downloaded e-mail correspondence to his or her personal
computer.19 6 Service providers acted as temporary storage mediums and typical-
ly deemed correspondence that went unopened for six months abandoned.' 9 7 In
addition, download speed was excessively lower in 1986. In 1985, the industry
standard for modems was 2400 bits per second; it would take 2.5 minutes at that
speed to download the United States Constitution.' 98
Today, however, service providers such as Gmail offer more than 7500
megabytes of free storage space,199 and Internet service providers such as Com-
cast offer download speeds up to 15 megabytes per second. 2 00 The efficiency
and practicality advanced communication tools offer have created a societal
dependency both for personal and economical purposes. Such technological
strides in just a couple of decades since the ECPA was enacted could not have
been in congressional foresight making the call to reform necessary based on
historical congressional policy.
A. Congress's Historical Policy ofIntervening
Based on the historical policy of Congress stepping in when technology
outpaces the law, the ECPA should be amended to include advanced communi-
cation tools such as social networks. In what is dubbed the "Digital Age,"20'
new technologies have advanced expediently compared to the law, and social
dependency on these tools requires congressional intervention.
The judicial system historically has addressed similar issues of technol-
ogical advancements sluggishly; however, upon recognizing and addressing the
issues, the Supreme Court made hasty, and sometimes, improper decisions.20 2
19 Ozza, supra note 160, at 1045.
196 Id.
19 Id. at 1072.
"' Id. at 1045.
'9 Gmail, GOOGLE, https://www.gmail.com (last visited Sept. 16, 2011).
200 Xfinity Internet from Comcast, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Leam/HighSpeedlnternet/highspeedinternet.html (last visited
Sept. 16, 2011). To clarify, eight bits comprise one byte, and one megabyte is composed of one
million bytes. University Information Technology Services, What Are Bits, Bytes, and Other Units
of Measure for Digital Information?, IND. UNIv., http://kb.iu.edu/data/ackw.html (last modified
Sept. 15, 2011). At 15 megabytes per second, Comcast's download speed consists of 120,000,000
bits per second compared to the standard in 1985. Id.
201 See generally PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 90.
202 See Olmstead v. United States, where the Supreme Court initially held an individual has no
expectation of privacy in communications over the telephone. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). In 1934, Con-
gress enacted the Communications Act of 1934, which stated the contrary. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1934). Further, the Court revisited the same privacy issue in Katz v. United States, holding an
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The Supreme Court addresses issues of privacy on a case-by-case basis, making
the judicial system incapable of addressing privacy problems involving technol-
ogical advancements until issues arise, and even then the Court is constrained by
the specific facts of each case.203 In the past when technology developed too
quickly for the Court to keep up, Congress typically established a statutory
framework reflective of societal needs.204
Congressional intervention is necessary because typically when com-
munication tools advance, risks of privacy intrusion develop almost simulta-
205-neously, creating exigent circumstances for protection. For example, wire
tapping developed practically contemporaneously with the telephone, and pre-
sented high risks of intrusion to personal privacy as the telephone became inte-
grated into everyday life.206
Olmstead v. United States is a prime example of the Supreme Court
adopting a narrow interpretation of privacy in the context of new technology on
the basis of specific facts.207 The Court affirmed a conviction based on evidence
"obtained by intercepting messages on the telephone . . .,208 by differentiating
between telephone calls and writing correspondence. The Court deemed such
interceptions constitutional because no physical trespass took place.209
In his famous dissenting opinion, Justice Louis Brandeis recognized a
broader scope of constitutional protection afforded to telephone conversa-
tions.2 10 Justice Brandeis warned against the limited scope adopted by the ma-
jority, stating that
[w]ays may some day be developed by which the government,
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in
the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.21 1
Congress recognized the issues Justice Brandeis foreshadowed and in
1934, just six years after the Olmstead decision, Congress enacted the Commu-
203 CATE, supra note 14, at 52.
204 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (2006); Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 21225 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006).
205 CATE, supra note 14, at 52.
206 Id.
207 277 U.S. 438.
208 Id. at 456.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 478.
211 Id. at 5 71.
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.212 rtatoCogestr-nications Act. The Communications Act was the first act of Congress to re-
quire a warrant for phone conversations, contrary to the ruling in Olmstead.2 13
Specifically, the Act prohibited unauthorized publication or use of communica-
tions by common carriers stating that "no person shall intercept ... divulge, or
publish" such communications.2 14 Further, the Act required common carriers to
establish policies and procedures for authorizing interception of communica-
tions or access to call-identifying communication, and for preventing unautho-
rized interception or access.2 15 The shift in policy came as the telephone became
more popular and ingrained in everyday life,216 but interpretation of the Act was
controversial.21 7 Government agents found loopholes and argued ambiguities.2 18
Further, the Attorney General's office assured government agencies it would not
prosecute violations of the Act. 21 9 Arguably, the Act did very little to restrict
wiretapping.22 0
Nearly forty years after Olmstead and more than thirty years after the
Communications Act of 1934, the Supreme Court finally reached a majority
decision in Katz v. United States,2 21 holding a warrantless wire tap in a tele-
phone booth unconstitutional on the basis of an individual's reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy and society's willingness to accept such an expectation. The Su-
preme Court adopted the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test in Katz on the
basis that privacy is not determined by location or method but rather the per-
son's intent.2 22 The Court further stated that the importance of innovations, such
as the telephone, called for a broader interpretation of the Constitution and
Fourth Amendment privacy. 223
212 Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1105 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (2006)).
213 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in
the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of James
Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy, Center for Democracy and Technology).
214 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1996).
215 Id
216 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in
the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 11Ith Cong. (2010) (statement of James
Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy, Center for Democracy and Technology).
217 See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).




221 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
222 Id.
223 Id. at 352.
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Just one year after Katz, Congress enacted the Federal Wiretap Act,22 4
which furthered its policy of striking a balance between the privacy needs of
individuals with the needs of law enforcement. The Act prohibited willful inter-
ception of wire or oral communications, and authorized government officials to
seek judicial approval to conduct wiretapping investigations.225 Congress
enacted the Federal Wiretap Act years before the cusp of electronic communica-
tions-Ray Tomlinson introduced electronic mail sent via the Internet in 1971
while the Act was introduced in 1968.226 Further, the Court established the
Third Party Doctrine in Miller in 1976, just five years after the introduction of e-
mail. 22 7 During this time and for several years following the decision, "e-mail
remained mostly private, [and was] used only by computer scientists, the mili-
tary, and then colleges and universities."22 8 The general public did not truly real-
ize the significance of Tomlinson's invention until the 1990s when the Internet
229became more accessible to more users.
Once again, Congress responded to the disparities in applying the Fed-
eral Wiretap Act and the Third Party Doctrine to advanced electronic communi-
cations by creating the ECPA.230 When Congress enacted the ECPA, it had the
same two goals: to protect the privacy of citizens and to address the needs of
law enforcement.23 1 Congress stated its purpose on the basis that the Framers of
the Constitution could not have foreseen such "dramatic changes" in methods of
intrusions:
When the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard against the
arbitrary use of Government power to maintain surveillance
over citizens, there were limited methods of intrusion into the
"houses, papers, and effects" protected by the [F]ourth
[A]mendment. During the intervening 200 years, development
of new methods of communication and devices for surveillance
224 Robert A. Pikowsky, An Overview of the Law ofElectronic Surveillance Post September 11,
2001, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 601, 602 (2002); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212-25 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522 (2000)).
225 Id
226 Joyce, supra note 52, at 43. Congress enacted the Federal Wiretap Act as part of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212-25 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522).
227 Id. See generally Miller v. United States, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
228 Joyce, supra note 52, at 43.
229 Id.
230 Id
231 S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
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has expanded dramatically the opportunity for such intru-
232slons.
Congress, quoting Justice Brandeis's famous dissenting opinion in
Olmstead, accepted a broad interpretation of the Constitution stating that exist-
ing law was "hopelessly out of date,"233 and that "[i]t has not kept pace with the
development of communications and computer technology. Nor has it kept pace
with changes in the structure of the telecommunications industry." 234
B. Outdated and Outpaced: Expediency of Technological Advancements
and Popularity Require Reform of the ECPA
In just thirty years, the ECPA is similarly "hopelessly out of date."
Technology has made sweeping advancements since 1986, and the introduction
of social networking sites and other advanced communications could not have
been in congressional foresight at the time the ECPA was enacted.235 Advance-
ments in technology since have resulted in an increase in individual usage. Ac-
cording to the United States Census Bureau, only 8.2 percent of households had
a personal computer in 1984 compared to 61.8 percent in 2003.236 Furthermore,
only 18 percent of households maintained Internet access in 1997 compared to
54.7 percent in 2007.237
Digital Due Process, a privacy advocates coalition, reasons that the
ECPA meets none of the goals set forth by Congress prior to its enactment be-
cause "[a]s presently applied, ECPA does not comport with user expectations,
does not meet law enforcement or judicial needs for clarity, creates non-trivial
costs for businesses seeking to comply with law enforcement requirements, and
erects barriers to the adoption of innovating, productivity enhancing technology
by American business."23 8
With the ECPA, Congress recognized the need for an exception to the
Third Party Doctrine for electronic communications at a time when electronic
communications had not fully developed--e-mail was in its beginning stages,
and access to personal computers and the Internet was limited. Just as the tele-
232 Id. at 3555.
233 Id. at 3556.
234 Id
235 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting Privacy in
the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of James
Dempsey, Vice President for Public Policy, Center for Democracy and Technology).
236 Jennifer Cheeseman Day, Alex Janus & Jessica Davis, Households With a Computer and
Internet Access: 1984 to 2003, U.S. Census Bureau (Oct. 2005), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p23-208.pdf. Respondents have not been asked any ques-
tions about computer access or ownership since 2003. Id
237 Id.
238 Burr, supra note 117, at 3.
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phone and e-mail play integral roles in facets of everyday life, social networking
is fast approaching the same essential communication role for millions of indi-
viduals.
As new ways of collecting, analyzing, and integrating data develop, the
economy is becoming more and more dependent on massive exchanges of in-
formation, such as targeted advertising.23 9 Computer databases have grown ex-
ceptionally since the beginning of the 1960s, which in turn "increased the threat
to privacy by creating large amounts of information about the details of peoples'
lives while providing little control over how this information might be used." 2 40
The increase in the number of users and the multifaceted communica-
tive utilities of social networking makes the activity worthy of the ECPA priva-
cy protection. Individuals are leading their social lives online, and the demo-
graphic is shifting from young people to people of all ages.241 For example, of
Facebook's touted 750 million users, thirty-seven percent of those users are
within the thirty-five to fifty-five age range. 24 2 The increase in Facebook popu-
larity among all ages makes privacy issues all the more important because very
few people are thinking ahead to realize the consequences of the information
they leave behind.2 43 Congressional intervention is warranted because "[a]t no
time in history has information . . . been more freely and publicly accessible to
so many others." 244
Communication via social networks is quickly taking an integral role in
personal and business communication. Facebook alone is growing at an expo-
nential rate with more than 750 million users.245 With Facebook's Private Mes-
sages, users can communicate with other users from a personal computer or a
cell phone regardless of whether they are using instant messaging, e-mail, or
private messages.246 Although Facebook allows for access beyond practical ser-
vice management or usage, the marketing genius behind targeted Facebook ads
makes social networking an imperative tool for business owners.24 7 Targeted
advertising directs marketing efforts toward the most applicable groups of
248people, efficiently resulting in more successful advertising campaigns. And
239 HENDERSON, supra note 29, at 15.
240 Id
241 Matthew Ingram, Facebook vs. Twitter: An InfoGraphic, GIGAOM (Dec. 20, 2010, 7:14
AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/20/facebook-vs-twitter-an-infographic/.
242 Id.
243 PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 90, at 53-54.
244 Id. at 54.




247 Vara, supra note 111; see generally CATE, supra note 14, at 14-15.
248 Vara, supra note 111; see generally CATE, supra note 14, at 14-15.
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social networks are not the only online communication companies utilizing tar-
geted advertising; commercial e-mail servers also are taking advantage of the
strategy.249 Furthermore, targeted advertising allows these companies to main-
tain the service at no cost to its users.
Additionally, social networks offer a number of personal benefits as
well such as encouraging self-expression and socialization, providing the ability
to stay connected with friends and family who are separated by geographical
distance, and the ability to meet new people with similar interests.25 1
The answer is that people have social reasons to participate on
social network sites, and these social motivations explain both
why users value Facebook notwithstanding its well-known pri-
vacy risks and why they systematically underestimate those
risks. Facebook provides users with a forum in which they can
craft social identities, forge reciprocal relationships, and accu-
mulate social capital. These are important, even primal, human
desires, whose immediacy can trigger systematic biases in the
mechanisms that people use to evaluate privacy risks.2 52
Increased popularity and dependency on social networks, and the inva-
luable benefits derived from the use of social networks makes the call to reform
all the more notable.
VI. CONCLUSION
At a minimum, Congress must amend the ECPA to include social net-
work communications by users with strict privacy settings on the basis that so-
cial networks perform a vital role in everyday life comparable to the telephone
and e-mail. When Congress enacted the ECPA, it accepted a broader interpreta-
tion of the Constitution on the basis that the law at the time was outdated, and
had not kept pace with current technology. The ECPA as it currently stands does
not protect most personal e-mail let alone social network communications, leav-
ing private communications, which are increasingly made via the Internet, at
risk to unreasonable intrusions.
Under Katz, social network users have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, but that expectation is diminished by the provider's third party access and
utilization of user information. The ECPA distinctions are becoming increasing-
249 Privacy Policy for Google Ads and the Google Display Network, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/privacylads/privacy-policy.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
250 Vara, supra note 111.
251 Petrashek, supra note 73, at 1519-20.
252 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1151 (2009).
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ly more difficult to apply to advanced communication tools such as social net-
works, and these changes require revision of the ECPA. Case-by-case applica-
tion of the ECPA to advanced communication tools creates disparity in the law
in an age when communication tools are advancing beyond the ECPA capabili-
ties at an exponential rate.
Congress historically has intervened when communication tools ad-
vance, become integrated into everyday life, and outpace the common law. So-
ciety's dependency both economically and personally requires expansion of the
ECPA to ensure national uniformity that Congress historically has provided.
Leaving these decisions to judicial discretion has created and will continue to
create disparity in the law on a case-by-case basis.
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